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Chapter II 
I nternational Law and 
Naval and Air Operations at Sea 
by 
Bernard H. Oxman* 
Introduction 
,...., he publication of The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 
..l. {NWP-9} is a suitable occasion for reconsidering the relationship 
between international law and naval and air operations at sea in times of 
peace.! 
The Handbook is replete with articulations of specific rules and principles 
of the law of the sea that may be of use to the naval or air commander. Its 
purpose is "general guidance" and "not a comprehensive treatment of the 
law."2 The rules and principles it articulates relating to navigation and 
overflight are expressly based on those set forth in the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,3 ,"[a ]lthough not signed by the United 
States and not yet in formal effect."4 The Handbook could hardly be 
significantly more faithful to the text of the ConventionS had the United States 
ratified the text of the Convention and Congress enacted penalties for its 
violation. 
Still the Handbook contains interesting innovations not found in the 
Convention. For example, use of the terms "national waters" and 
"international waters"6 was doubtless designed to facilitate an explication 
to the non-expert of the law of naval and air operations in the exclusive 
economic zone.7 If the summa divisio between "national" and "international" 
waters persists as su~h in coastal areas-a matter open to some doubt-it 
might be useful for the commander to know that the classifications set forth 
in the Handbook might prove controversial. Unlike the authors of the Handbook, 
some coastal states would regard the exclusive economic zone as falling within 
the former category and at least some commentators might regard 
international straits (and comparable archipelagic sealanes) as falling within 
the latter category. 
Another arguable innovation is the concept of "assistance entry" into the 
territorial sea.8 The concept is appropriately rooted in the ancient duty of 
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mariners "to assist those in danger of being lost at sea. ''9 Although the Law 
of the Sea Convention does not expressly address the question of entry into 
the territorial sea for the purpose of rescue, textual support can be found 
in the newly articulated and analogous principle of the Convention that 
permits stopping and anchoring while in innocent passage through the 
territorial sea "for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or 
aircraft in danger or distress. "10 In the principle that the sovereignty of the 
coastal state over the territorial sea is subject to other rules of international 
law,l1 and in the principle that the coastal state's rights and jurisdiction must 
be exercised in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right,12 one 
can find ample basis for concluding that the coastal state's rights must be 
interpreted in light of the ancient duty to rescue, and that the coastal state 
is presumed to consent to bona fide efforts to rescue those in danger of being 
lost at sea. 
Probably in order to avoid too much confusing detail, the Handbook is also 
less than complete on the question of straits overlapped by internal waters.t3 
Article 35(a) of the Law of the Sea Convention makes it clear that the regime 
of straits applies to internal waters established by a system of straight baselines 
in accordance with the Convention where the waters enclosed were not 
previously considered internal (that is they would not be regarded as juridical 
bays, for example). Why then, except perhaps for reasons of economy of text, 
is overflight excluded from transit passage of such straits?14 Why is the 
discussion of international straits essentially limited to "International Straits 
Overlapped by Territorial Seas?"15 
All (or at least almost all) of this is as it should be. Taken as a whole, the 
Handbook should achieve its purposes admirably. This writer has expressed 
his specific views on the legal rules governing naval and air operations at 
sea elsewhere, and will not repeat them here.16 
What the Handbook does not address, or addresses only in passing, is why 
those concerned with naval and air operations at sea should be concerned 
with the international law of the sea. Such an analysis is probably beyond 
the scope of a handbook of the kind addressed here. But the analysis is essential 
, if one is to understand what one is probably reading, and why one is reading 
it, when one refers to the Handbook. 
The Duty to Obey International Law 
From the perspective of the naval commander, a fairly simple answer can 
be posed to the question, "Why worry about international law?" As the 
Handbook notes,17 article 0605 of U.S. Navy Regulations, 1973, states: 
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At all times, a commander shall observe and require his command to observe the 
principles of international law. Where necessary to the fulfillment of this responsibility, 
a departure from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized. 
The Handbook also attempts an explanation of the underlying reasons for 
this duty: 
International law provides stability in international relations and an expectation that 
certain acts or omissions will effect predictable consequences. If one nation violates the 
law, it may expect that others will reciprocate. Consequently, failure to comply with 
international law ordinarily involves greater political and economic costs than does 
observance.l8 
The Handbook does not stop there however. It ventures into the complex 
world of law and interest when it states, "In short, nations comply with 
international law because it is in their interest to do so. "19 This sentence is 
not without its ambiguities. Legal restraints are of particular significance 
when one perceives an interest in ignoring those restraints. What the authors 
presumably mean is that the interest in observing international law ordinarily 
outweighs the perceived interest in acting otherwise in a particular instance. 
The brief discussion concludes with a declaration at once as terse and as 
pregnant as one is likely to encounter: "Like most rules of conduct, 
international law is in a continual state of development and change."2O 
Nothing at all is said about the role of the Handbook itself in this process. 
As for the role of naval and air forces, the Handbook asserts: 
When maritime nations appear to acquiesce in excessive maritime claims and fail 
to exercise their rights actively in the face of constraints on international navigation 
and overflight, those claims and constraints may, in time, be considered to have been 
accepted by the international community as reflecting the practice of nations and as 
binding upon all users of the seas and superjacent airspace. Consequently, it is incumbent 
upon maritime nations to protest through diplomatic channels all excessive claims of 
coastal or island nations, and to exercise their navigation and overflight rights in the 
face of such claims. The President's Oceans Policy Statement makes clear that the u.S. 
has accepted this responsibility as a fundamental element of its national policy.21 
What the Handbook appears to be saying is that because the law may evolve 
and change, it is important for the United States to influence that process, 
where appropriate, using its naval and air forces to that end. More than that, 
the Handbook appears to be used to resist attempts by other states to change 
the law, particularly "excessive maritime [presumably coastal state] claims" 
and "constraints on international navigation and overflight." The "law" that 
the United States will defend is expressly identified with the rules of the Law 
of the Sea Convention affecting navigation and overflight rights. 
We have now moved beyond a mere duty to respect international law as 
it is now or as it may evolve in the future. The law of the sea, at least that 
part of it governing naval and air operations at sea, has itselfbecome an object 
of those operations. Why? 
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International Law and Large Navies 
Large navies operate around the world. Their ships approach or enter the 
territory of many states. Their operations are subject to scrutiny within their 
own government and legislature, by their own press and public at least in 
democratic states, and by the governments, press and people of foreign 
countries, whether friendly or hostile. Alone or in combination, every one 
of these groups has some actual or potential influence on the ability to define 
naval missions and to carry them out. The question of whether they should 
have such influence is beside the point. 
Few naval missions (other than purely humanitarian assistance) are likely 
to be applauded by everyone. Even a peaceful visit to a port of a friendly 
country may be an implicit warning to others. The capacity to define and 
carry out naval missions is maximized if one maximizes the number of people 
with influence over the definition or execution of the mission who believe 
that: 
(1) the specific mission is desirable; 
(2) navies should have the right to conduct that kind of activity in the 
manner undertaken; and 
(3) navies do have the right to conduct that kind of activity in the manner 
undertaken. 
Human nature being what it is, there is some likelihood that an individual 
who falls within group 1 will also fall within group 2, and that an individual 
who falls within group 2 will also fall within group 3. However, not everyone 
who falls within group 1 or even 2 will necessarily fall within group 3. For 
example, some people who believe that Israel's rescue of hostages in Entebbe 
or even its raid on the Iraqi nuclea~ reactor were, if viewed in isolation, 
desirable, also believe that such intrusions into the territory of a foreign state 
are (and should be) of doubtful legality. 
Moreover, what if a significant number of people with actual or potential 
influence over the definition or execution of the mission do not believe that 
the specific mission, or its mode of execution, is desirable? The objective in 
that case to achieve their acquiescence is facilitated (but by no means 
guaranteed) if they are persuaded either that the navy should, or that it does, 
have a right to carry out the mission in the manner contemplated.22 To put 
the matter differently, the political, economic or military resources that must 
be expended to achieve acquiescence are minimized, and often eliminated, 
if those whose acquiescence is sought believe a navy does or should have a 
right to undertake the action in the manner contemplated.23 
Since no government's political, economic, or military resources are 
unlimited, the more costly it is to achieve acquiescence, the more limited 
are a government's options to choose and execute its naval missions. 
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Accordingly, perceptions of what the law is or should be by people with 
influence over the definition or execution of the mission have a real influence 
over the range of a government's naval options. 
Whose Acquiescence is Important? 
For purposes of this analysis, a naval or air mission might be divided into 
three parts: the objective, the means, and the logistics. 
We might assume, for example, that the proposition up.for decision is 
delivering a warning to some government or group in the eastern 
Mediterranean region designed to deter violence or escalation of violence on 
land or at sea. We might assume further that the means under consideration 
are a substantial augmentation of naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean 
Sea. Finally, we might assume that the augmentation would require the 
movement of ships from the Atlantic Ocean and perhaps the Indian Ocean, 
the former through the Strait of Gibraltar and the latter through the Strait 
of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal. 
The classic argument for maintaining and using a large surface navy in this 
manner is nicely summarized in the Handbook: 
Depending upon the magnitude and immediacy of the problem, naval forces may be 
positioned near areas of potential discord as a show of force or as a symbolic expression 
of support and concern. Unlike land-based forces, naval forces may be so employed 
without political entanglement and without the necessity of seeking littoral nation 
consent.24 
Three aspects of this statement require emphasis. First, it is normally 
assumed that the naval forces will be positioned "near areas of potential 
discord," that is near land, and may engage in naval maneuvers once there.25 
This is true whether one wishes to influence the behavior of regular or 
irregular land forces or the behavior of armed ships or boats likely to operate 
mainly in coastal areas. Second, it is normally assumed that some 
"positioning" in response to the specific mission is required, i.e. that the ships 
will have to be moved into position from elsewhere. Third, it is assumed that 
the positioning may be achieved "without political entanglement and without 
the necessity of seeking littoral nation consent." 
Taken together, these assumptions presuppose the acquiescence of three 
different classes of foreign states. The first class comprises the state or states 
near whose coast the force will be positioned. The second class consists of 
the state or states off whose coast the ships will navigate en route to their 
position. The third class embraces other states with global or "blue water" 
navies.26 
Let us assume that states in all three classes either oppose, do not wish to 
support, or do not wish to appear to support the mission. The question then 
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becomes one of acquiescence. The various classes of states will be examined 
in reverse order in this connection. 
1. Other Naval Powers 
Much attention is normally devoted to the third class and, in particular, 
the Soviet Union. History has demonstrated that the United States and Soviet 
navies and air forces, notwithstanding occasional lapses into pubescent 
behavior,27 are reluctant to engage each other far from their shores (and 
exercise at least relative caution even in their own waters). The reaction of 
other major naval powers is therefore ordinarily a political rather than strictly 
military consideration, although one must of course bear in mind that political 
cost may reduce one's flexibility to undertake a mission. 
Moreover, because the same rules normally apply to all, it may be assumed 
that governments with large navies generally believe all states have, or should 
have, the right to do what large navies generally do. In other words, much 
as the Soviet Union may dislike a particular United States naval mission in 
the eastern Mediterranean Sea, or the United States may dislike a particular 
Soviet naval mission in the Caribbean Sea, each is likely not only to concede 
(albeit privately) the legal right of the other to do what it is doing, but perhaps 
even welcome (albeit silently) the augmentation of state practice in support 
of the kinds of operations large navies undertake.28 
From this analysis, one may draw at least the following inferences regarding 
the effect of the international law of the sea on the acquiescence of other 
naval powers in operations off the coasts of third states. The naval powers 
have no desire to engage each other directly. The law of the sea would appear 
to be relevant to the degree of acquiescence obtained from other naval powers 
in two different ways. If the naval powers disagree on what the law of the 
sea rules are or should be, and that disagreement involves the question of 
whether there has been an incursion on the territory or rights bf a third state 
by the naval power undertaking the mission, the disagreement could force 
a more severely negative reaction by the other naval power either in principle 
or because of political or defense commitments to the third state. Conversely, 
if the naval powers agree on what the law of the sea rules are, and those 
rules are observed, the perception that the power undertaking the mission 
is within its rights-and that other naval powers wish to preserve the right 
to do the same thing elsewhere-may increase the degree of acquiescence, 
that is dampen the political opposition. 
This is the first illustration of a basic point central to the relationship 
between the law of the sea and naval and air operations at sea: to the extent 
that the law of the sea is relevant to the question of acquiescence by a foreign 
power, its relevance depends not on what the naval power undertaking the 
mission believes its rights to be, or even on whether that belief is well founded 
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in law, policy or good morals, but rather on whether the powers concerned 
agree or disagree with each other on what the rules are. 
2. States Off Whose Coast Ships Will Navigate En Route to Their Position 
The Handbook assumes that ships will be able to navigate to their intended 
position "without political entanglement and without the necessity of seeking 
littoral nation consent." In this case, the reference is therefore to the 
acquiescence of states off whose coasts ships will navigate en route to their 
position. In this connection, the political, military, and psychological question 
of what constitutes a route close to the coast of another country must be 
distinguished from the strictly legal question of what rights a state may claim 
and exercise in waters off its coast. For purposes of this analysis, the 
acquiescence of a state "off whose coast" one must navigate is relevant if 
that state has the means and the will to disrupt, or otherwise increase the 
political, economic or military cost of, the mission. 
A route close to land may be selected because of geographic necessity. For 
example, a ship cannot enter or leave the Mediterranean Sea without 
traversing a strait (or canal) at some point. Some seas are so constricted that 
one is rarely far from land. A route close to land may be selected for reasons 
of safety or weather. It may also be selected because it is substantially shorter 
and more convenient than an alternative route. The same considerations may 
apply in the case of military aircraft where consent to overfly land territory 
is unavailable.29 
The acquiescence of states along a selected route therefore affects the 
mobility of naval forces as well as the mobility of air forces for which consent 
to overfly land territory is unavailable. Such acquiescence affects naval and 
air transports in the same way, whether used to move ground or amphibious 
forces or to deliver material to friendly foreign forces. The number of states 
potentially involved is large and difficult to predict. It depends on the location 
of possible missions, the location of ships when assigned spch missions, and 
the routes selected. 
In considering the implications of this problem, one must bear in mind that 
states do not have balanced bilateral reciprocal interests in the right to 
navigate off each other's coast without consent.30 
One reason for the imbalance relates to geographic position. Not many 
states have an overwhelming interest in navigating close to the coast of the 
United States without consent, despite the enormity of the Unitecl.States 
coastline. Many would perceive a far greater interest in navigating close to 
England and France, Spain and Morocco, Greece and Turkey, Oman and Iran, 
or Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Another reason for the imbalance relates to naval capacity, defense 
strategy, and foreign policy. Very few states maintain global navies or a 
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defense strategy or foreign policy that entails deployment of their navies at 
great distances from their own shores. While it is true that a significant 
number of states rely, explicitly or implicitly, on the mobility of a global 
navy for protection from another global power or ambitious regional powers, 
not many are likely to attach a high priority to this interest without insistent 
reminders from their naval ally. Moreover, in some regions, particularly semi-
enclosed seas, it is fashionable to believe that elimination of the right of 
warships (of global navies) to navigate in the region would, by removing the 
great naval powers, promote peace and stability. These views are sometimes 
inspired by regional powers whose ambitions may be held in check by the 
actual or potential presence of a global navy. 
The significance of the imbalance means that unlike other naval powers, 
states along the route taken to a mission position will not necessarily perceive 
a strong interest (if any) in the proposition that navies should generally have 
the right to navigate close to the coast in order to take the necessary or most 
convenient route to their mission destination. Thus, to the extent one wishes 
to encourage their acquiescence in the use of the route off their coast, one 
must often rely more on their perception of what the law is than on their 
perception of what the law should be. 
The acquiescence of this particular group of states is central to any concept 
of flexibility to deploy forces at sea. Prudence requires the planner to 
anticipate that a naval force may provoke political resistance and retaliation, 
or even armed resistance, once the force reaches its mission position 
(especially when the very purpose of the mission is to deter violent behavior 
by those in the region). But what if, even in peacetime, the decision-maker 
must deal with such contingencies not only at the mission destination but in 
connection with the movement of ships to their destination? 
Several methods for promoting acquiescence are possible. One is the threat 
of armed resistance or retaliation. A cost of this approach is that every naval 
mission then requires the potential diversion of additional military resources 
to yet another mission, namely defense of the means to reach -the_@ssion 
destination. In addition, the political or economic costs of threatening friends 
and the military costs of threatening adversaries may be too high. 
Another method is the threat of economic retaliation. Such retaliation is 
in fact more difficult than it appears. Those responsible for international trade 
policy can be expected to resist interference with trade either in principle 
or because the United States as well as the target state would be hurt. 
Moreover, absent an extreme emergency, forceful military or economic 
measures are unlikely to be used unless those individuals with substantial 
influence over decisions by the government of a major naval power believe 
there is a legal right to use the route in question. In other words, before one 
can effectively pressure the foreign state to acquiesce, one must have 
persuaded one's domestic constituency of the right to use the route. That 
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constituency will include all relevant participants in government decision-
making (including defense and foreign ministry lawyers), members of the 
legislature, informed and influential members of the public, and at least some 
influential friendly foreign leaders. Therefore, even if one chooses to ignore 
international law as such as the means to obtain acquiescence from the foreign 
states concerned, one would probably need to use international law to 
persuade the relevant domestic constituency to threaten military or economic 
retaliation. 
One also may purchase acquiescence. Those familiar with the full political, 
military, and economic costs of some base-rights agreements could doubtless 
appreciate what it would cost to buy, on a bilateral basis, acquiescence in 
the right to navigate along all foreign coasts likely to lie astride the approaches 
to possible mission destinations. As previously noted, very few states would 
perceive a reciprocal interest in the right to operate warships (or even 
merchant ships) off the United States coast. Most would wish something in 
return that they would not otherwise receive; many would insist that the value 
to them of what is received be comparable to the value to the United States 
of the mobility of its naval forces; a goodly number would reserve an explicit 
or implicit right to renegotiate terms or end the arrangement; and some would 
refuse (or would be forced by political pressures to refuse) to deal at any 
conceivably acceptable price}1 One must also bear in mind that purchasing 
(agreeing bilaterally on the existence of) rights to navigate in one place 
arguably implies that exercising such rights in similar areas elsewhere requires 
agreement of the coastal state. 
This analysis suggests that the international law of the sea would be a useful 
tool in helping to induce the acquiescence of foreign states lying along the 
route to a particular mission. A variety of tactical considerations reinforce 
this conclusion. 
While the number of states that perceive a direct interest in the global 
mobility of warships may be small, the number that perceive an important 
interest in the free movement of international trade by sea is quite large. By 
linking the two in a single principle of freedom of navigation or free transit 
of straits, one can substantially increase the number of governments that 
believe all ships (and therefore warships) should have a right to navigate along 
the coast where necessary to reach their destination. 
Some governments would have difficulty gaining domestic acceptance of 
the premise that all warships, or warships of a particular state, have been 
accorded a right to navigate off the coast. Their capacity to act on the basis 
of such a premise is enhanced if the right is not localized, but rather derives 
from a global rule applicable to all similarly situated coastal states 
everywhere. 
This being said, we must recall the object of th.e exercise: inducing the 
acquiescence of states lying along the routes used to reach the mission 
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destination despite their opposition to, or unwillingness to support, the mission 
itself. This is then the second illustration of the basic point, referred to earlier, 
central to the relationship between the law of the sea and air operations at 
sea. 
The challenge then is to affect the perceptions of others as to what the 
law is (what some term their "expectations"). 
One way is to persuade them that the particular proffered rule oflaw serves 
their interests. The potential for using this approach has already been 
discussed. 
Another way is to rely on habit. There is some tendency to associate the 
factual status quo with the legal status quo. If your neighbor crosses your land 
regularly, you are more likely to believe that he has a right to do so or, perhaps 
more importantly, that you would be disrupting good-neighborly relations 
("legitimate expectations founded on custom") if you tried to stop him. Thus, 
whatever the theoretical relationship between a program of exercise of rights 
and the preservation of rights under international law, foreign states as a 
practical matter are more likely to acquiesce in activities off their coasts that 
occur regularly and without serious impairment of their interests. 
Still another way is to influence directly the foreign state's perceptions 
of legitimacy, that is, to operate from a platform of principle likely to be 
accepted by the foreign state in determining its own behavior. One thing is 
certain: ·a platform of principle unilaterally enunciated by the naval power 
(including its legislature and its domestic partisans) is not likely to be regarded 
by foreign states as "law" necessarily binding on them. 
To induce foreign acquiescence in navigation rights important to naval 
mobility, we must find propositions that: 
(1) are understood to allow activities important to naval mobility, and 
(2) are accepted as law by the states off whose coast one must navigate. 
The most commonly cited repository of such propositions is called 
customary international law, fairly defined by the Handbook as the "general 
and consistent practice among nations with respect to a particular subject, 
which over time is accepted by them generally as a legal obligation. "32 But 
if this is so, have we come full circle? 
The object of the exercise was to use law, rather than or in conjunction 
with other means, to induce foreign acquiescence at the lowest possible cost. 
Yet we are now told that this law rests on general and consistent practice 
among nations. Therefore, in order to ensure our first objective, namely that 
the law is understood to allow activities important to naval mobility, we will 
have to discourage states everywhere in the world from engaging in practices 
to the contrary. Whether we are especially interested in the actual or potential 
need to use an area off the coast of a particular state, we must discourage 
the emergence of new practices inconsistent with our view of what the 
relevant law is and needs to be. 
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When we object to the change in practice, the foreign state could accurately 
quote the Handbook: "[L Jike most rules of conduct, international law is in a 
continual state of development and change. "33 The foreign state might add: 
If law changes, and if customary international law is rooted in general 
practice, then the only way customary law can change is if general practice 
changes, and the only way general practice can change is if someone starts 
the process alone. 
How then do we ensure that state practice is generally consistent with the 
existence of rights necessary to naval mobility? One way is by investing 
political, economic, and even military resources in the endeavor. This means 
that those concerned with the maintenance of an international law of the sea 
that encourages acquiescence of foreign states in naval operations must 
constantly persuade their colleagues in government that this is an objective 
worth the investment of national resources. Their task is not an easy one. 
The same people are frequently asking for money to acquire and maintain 
the ships and personnel necessary to have a navy. The political or economic 
costs of doing more than protesting adverse claims (practice) by a foreign 
coastal state are likely to be more immediate or apparent t~an the abstract 
erosion of a legal position. 
Another possibility is to place more direct emphasis on the element of 
acceptance of a legal obligation and less on practice. One example would 
be a treaty setting forth the relevant rules and accepted by all. This is exactly 
what was attempted in the negotiation of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea.34 But for serious disagreements on the question of 
mining of seabed hard minerals in areas beyond (at times well beyond) 200 
miles from any land, it appears that the Convention might have achieved very 
widespread ratification, thus by definition setting forth rules regarded by 
foreign states as legally binding on them. Moreover, since the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, a very large number of states 
seem prepared to accept all or virtually all of the propositions set forth in 
the Convention as an authoritative source of law binding on all. 
The Handbook, the Statement of the President on United States Oceans 
Policy,35 and other government statements represent an effort to use the treaty 
strategy under the rubric of customary international law. They declare that 
the propositions set forth in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea reflect 
customary international law. Where the Convention text is sufficiently 
precise, legal argument is then largely confined to interpretation of the text 
as if it were a treaty, with little if any attention devoted to state practice. 
States that make claims or undertake activities regarded as inconsistent with 
the propositions set forth in the Convention are told that their activities are 
inconsistent with the Convention and therefore illegal under customary 
international law. 
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The reason for this approach is obvious. The propositions set forth in the 
Convention are generally understood to allow activities important to naval 
mobility. Because the Convention was negotiated largely by a consensus 
procedure over a long period of time with the participation of the entire 
community of states, it enjoys substantial legitimacy as a source of rules 
binding on all. Thus, from the perspective of naval mobility, there is nothing 
to gain and a great deal to lose by allowing inconsistent state practice to 
overtake the Convention as a source oflaw in any specific instance or, even 
more importantly, in principle. 
It is open to serious doubt whether a government that refuses to ratify the 
Convention, or even to renegotiate the objectionable deep seabed mining 
provisions, can succeed in the long run in persuading foreign governments 
to respect as law the provisions of the Convention affecting navigation, 
overflight and related naval activities. But the authors of the Handbook, 
compelled to accept that risk for the present, are almost certainly correct 
in concluding that treating the Convention as if it were a treaty in force for 
all, including positive "enforcement" of its provisions if need be, represents 
a policy regarding the law of the sea most likely to achieve the underlying 
naval objective: acquiescence by others in activities important to naval 
mobility at the lowest possible cost. 
It is in this context that the provisions of the Handbook regarding the exercise 
and assertion of navigation and overflight rights and freedoms might be 
understood.36 The strategy for inducing foreign acquiescence in naval 
activities seems to be one of combining habit with the textual legitimacy of 
the Convention. The Convention serves a double function in this regard. First, 
it is the most plausible platform of principle from which to seek to encourage 
foreign acquiescence. Second, because of its international pedigree, it is the 
most plausible platform of principle from which to seek domestic support 
for a sometimes risky or costly program of exercise of rights and freedoms 
designed to establish a pattern, or habit, of naval activity around the world 
permitted by the Convention (at least as understood by the United States). 
3. States Near Whose Coast the Force Will be Positioned 
Much of the analysis set forth in the previous section is relevant to the 
question of positioning forces off a state "without the necessity of seeking 
littoral state consent." The most important new element is that the objective 
of deploying forces "without political entanglement" becomes a larger part 
of the equation. 
In principle, it is of course difficult to station a naval force off any area 
of actual or potential conflict "without political entanglement." Indeed, the 
very objective is "a show of force" or "a symbolic expression of support 
and concern." The key to the point being made in the Handbook is that 
"[u]nlike land-based forces," naval forces may be positioned near areas of 
potential discord without political entanglement. The salient difference 
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would appear to be the possibility of positioning naval forces near areas of 
potential discord without introducing a military presence into the territory 
of a foreign state, particularly one that is the scene, object, or source of the 
discord. 
This facility can be important in two opposite situations. In one situation, 
the appearance of the naval force off the coast of a state may be designed 
as a warning to those threatening that state or its government. If the naval 
force is deemed to be located outside the coastal state and its consent is not 
required for the force to be positioned in the area, then both the coastal state 
and the naval power can reap the benefits of the force's presence without 
necessarily implying any political or military alliance or arrangement, and 
in particular without the stationing of armed forces of a major power on the 
territory of the state concerned. 
In another situation, the appearance of the naval force off the coast of a 
state may be designed as a warning to that very state's government. If the 
naval force is deemed to be located outside the coastal state and its consent 
is not required for the force to be positioned in the area, then the coastal 
state is in a position to react to the message as it deems best without the need 
to defend its territory from intrusion, while the naval power is in a position 
to send a very strong and direct message without necessarily entangling itself 
in armed hostilities. 
To an important degree, the positioning of the naval force in both of these 
scenarios depends on the coastal state's perception of the extent of its maritime 
territory and jurisdiction. In some circumstances, the political or military 
consequences of entering a maritime area claimed by the coastal state may 
be the same whether or not that claim is recognized by the naval power. 
If the purpose of the mission is to support the government of the coastal state, 
one would presumably prefer to avoid, if possible, a potentially embarrassing 
dispute over an intrusion into what the coastal state regards as its territory. 
If the purpose of the mission is to warn the government of the coastal state 
while minimizing the risk of direct military engagement, the risk of a military 
or political reaction to an intrusion into the state's claimed waters must be 
considered even if the claim is not recognized by the naval power (and perhaps 
others).37 
This, then, is a third illustration of the basic point, referred to earlier, 
central to the relationship between the law of the sea and naval and air 
operations at sea. 
Naval and Air Operations at Sea, 
International Law and Domestic Politics 
The influence of the international law of the sea on domestic politics has 
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two important implications for naval and air operations at sea. Both relate 
to the restraints on and costs of deploying naval or air forces in furtherance 
of political, military or economic objectives. 
A deployment may be opposed for legal reasons by either supporters or 
opponents of a mission. Legal objections may preclude a decision to deploy, 
may increase the domestic political costs of the deployment, or may erode 
domestic support for the mission and more generally for the maintenance of 
military and naval options. The greater the doubts about the international 
legality of a naval operation, the greater the difficulty one may encounter 
in assembling and maintaining the necessary domestic support. A foreign 
ministry will not necessarily accept a navy's view of what the law permits; 
a legislature will not necessarily accept a foreign ministry's view; and an 
informed public will not necessarily accept the legislature's view. In brief, 
the international pedigree of the platform of principle on which a naval 
mission is based must be almost, if not quite, as great for domestic reasons 
as for international ones. 
The maritime interests of a large naval power are by no means limited 
to the preservation of its options to deploy its navy at will to different parts 
of the world. Like those of most coastal states, its people would probably 
want uninvited foreign navies to stay far away, control of as much of the 
ocean's natural resources off the coast as possible, stronger measures to 
intercept illegal immigrants and smugglers, and would probably fear an 
environmental catastrophe not only from tankers and oil rigs off the coast 
but perhaps from nuclear armed or powered warships or aircraft. If the 
paradigm coastal state might prefer a thousand-mile territorial sea for itself 
without regard to the global consequences, the paradigm maritime power, 
since it is also a coastal state, would probably prefer a thousand-mile 
territorial sea for itself and a three-mile territorial sea for everyone else. 
Limiting the authority of coastal states over the use of the sea off their 
coasts is important to global navies and, more broadly, global deployment 
of armed forces; to international trade and communications; and to those 
fishermen who seek their livelihood off foreign coasts rather than their own. 
Most remaining ocean interests either favor increased control of the sea by 
coastal nations, or are unconcerned with the issue. Accordingly, the legislators 
of even great naval powers are under constant pressure to expand the coastal 
state's control over the oceans in one area or another or for one purpose or 
another. 
This pressure presents a global navy with two problems. First, it cannot 
plausibly assert rights off foreign coasts that its own government denies 
foreign ships or aircraft off its own coast. Second, aD;.d more seriously, 
increasing unilateral assertions of coastal state jurisdiction by the great naval 
powers tends to legitimate the notion that each coastal state may unilaterally 
assert control over activities off its coast to the extent such an assertion serves 
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its interests. The fact that a global naval power may perceive an interest in 
coastal state control of fishing vessels but not warships does not, from this 
perspective, preclude some other state from calculating its interests in a 
different way and making different kinds of unilateral claims. The whims 
of a quixotic national legislature are unlikely to provide a firm foundation 
for a platform of principle from which to seek global acquiescence in the 
definition and exercise of legal rights. 
The problem is even more severe if the global navy is attempting to 
harmonize perceptions of legality around a particular articulation of the law, 
in this case the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. The key to this effort 
is the legitimacy not merely (and in some cases not principally) of the 
particular rule set forth in the Convention, but rather the legitimacy that 
flows from the notion that the Convention itselfis the reflection of the positive 
will of the community of states. Quite apart from the controversy over deep 
seabed mining, if the legislature of the naval power exercises the option to 
ignore certain proscriptions of the Convention, why should other states not 
ignore other proscriptions? 
Given the strong competing pressures on their own government and 
legislature, the promoters of a law of the sea conducive to foreign 
acquiescence in global naval operations are constantly attempting to prevent 
domestic laws or actions, often in response to problems of the moment, that 
would undermine the navy's long-term global legal position and strategy. 
Their ability to persuade their own government to respect certain rules and 
restraints depends in part on what domestic decision-makers and their advisers 
believe international law requires. 
Whether or not one may properly characterize as wishful thinking the view 
that customary international law based on the 1982 U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea will restrain the behavior of foreign governments as much 
as a ratified Convention would, there is no basis whatever for believing that 
the United States Congress, in the face of political pressures to the contrary, 
is as likely to respect the restraints imposed by an unratified treaty as it is 
a ratified one. Indeed, as a matter of the pure theory of customary 
international law, it is likely that international custom and practice would 
rather quickly conform to virtually any coastal state claim likely to be made 
by the United States, precisely because the state with perhaps the greatest 
interest in opposing and capacity to oppose the emergence of such custom 
and practice is the one making the claim in the first place. 
No international legal strategy can alone solve the domestic problem. Those 
responsible for promoting a legal climate conducive to protecting the option 
of present and future governments to deploy naval forces to any part of the 
sea must however recognize that a strategy for ensuring domestic restraint 
is at least as important as a strategy for ensuring foreign restraint. Indeed, 
an excessive claim by one foreign state may well have no operational 
34 Law of Naval Operations 
significance and limited legal impact. On the other hand, every domestic claim 
by a major naval power automatically limits the options of its navy in every 
part of the world, and frequently tempts significant numbers of foreign 
governments to make even more ambitious claims. 
Conclusion 
The willingness of foreign governments to acquiesce in naval operations 
has an important bearing on the range, cost and utility of options to maint;1in 
and deploy a navy off foreign shores. The perceptions of foreign governments 
regarding the rights and obligations of states with respect to naval operations 
may in turn have an important bearing on their willingness to acquiesce in 
such operations. Any long-term naval strategy should therefore contain 
within it a strategy for influencing the perceptions of foreign governments 
regarding the content of the international law of the sea and enhancing their 
willingness to respect its proscriptions voluntarily. That strategy should also 
include a system for ensuring scrupulous domestic restraint along similar lines. 
Any successful strategy for achieving these legal goals will entail some 
political, economic, and even military costs. Those costs must be measured 
against the importance of maintaining the option to deploy a navy off foreign 
shores and the likelihood and costs of obtaining by other means the desired 
degree of foreign acquiescence over time and in all the places it may be needed. 
Moreover, the alternative costs of different strategies for achieving these legal 
goals must be assessed carefully. 
The Handbook is a useful part of this process. At the least it encourages 
behavior from United States forces consistent with the international legal 
positions and objectives of the United States. It is a reasonably accurate guide 
to the perceptions of foreign governments primarily because it is based on 
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accordingly, it is likely to remain 
an accurate guide only so long as the United States and foreign governments 
resist the temptation to act in ways at variance with the provisions of the 
Convention limiting coastal state powers in principle, and in particular over 
navigation, ov~rf1ight and related naval operations. 
It is not likely that many coastal states (or legal commentators) will 
conclude that custqmary international law limits the freedom of action of 
coastal states more than the Convention. Any significant change in the law 
of the sea is therefore likely to be either neutral or prejudicial from the 
perspective of naval operations, not favorable. The Handbook is therefore 
correct in seeking to anchor the future evolution of the sea in the principles 
of the Convention. It is also correct in emphasizing the importance of a 
program of routine exercise of rights and freedoms not only to avoid 
perceptions of acquiescence in coastal state claims but to enhance the 
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perception that naval operations are normal and lawful. While the point is 
not made, such a program is important whether or not there is a ratified 
Convention. The meaning and effect of treaties may also evolve in response 
to practice. 
The question remains whether the objectives of a legal strategy would be 
enhanced by a globally ratified Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 
considering this matter, two additional questions are particularly important. 
First, are governments more likely to respect the restraints on their freedom 
of action set forth in a ratified Convention on the Law of the Sea? Second, 
are missions for the purpose of exercising rights and freedoms protected by 
the Convention, in the face of inconsistent claims or otherwise, more likely 
to be supported by the Executive Branch.and Congress if they are rooted 
in ensuring respect for a ratified Convention? 
If these questions are answered in the affirmative, then are the benefits 
of a widely ratified Convention worth the costs that may be entailed in 
obtaining it? Stripped of the legal and political rhetoric hurled at this issue, 
it comes down to a simple question of priorities. 
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